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This paper uses a sample of 73 developing countries 
to estimate the change in the cost of alleviating urban 
poverty brought about by the recent increase in food 
prices. This cost is approximated by the change in the 
poverty deficit, that is, the variation in financial resources 
required to eliminate poverty under perfect targeting. The 
results show that, for most countries, the cost represents 
less than 0.1 percent of gross domestic product. However, 
in the most severely affected, it may exceed 3 percent. In 
This paper—a product of the Development Economics Vice Presidency (DEC)—is part of a larger effort in the department 
to analyze policy-relevant topics rigorously with the best available information to support decision making. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at sdessus@
worldbank.org, sherrera@worldbank.org, rdehoyos@worldbank.org.  
all countries, the change in the poverty deficit is mostly 
due to the negative real income effect of those households 
that were poor before the price shock, while the cost 
attributable to new households falling into poverty is 
negligible. Thus, in countries where transfer mechanisms 
with effective targeting already exist, the most cost-
effective strategy would be to scale up such programs 
rather than designing tools to identify the new poor. 
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The objective of this paper is to estimate the monetary cost of alleviating urban poverty 
changes induced by the increase in food prices since 2005 in a large sample of 
developing countries. The cost is approximated by the change in the “poverty deficit” 
(Atkinson, 1987), that is, the variation in financial resources required to lift all urban poor 
out of poverty under perfect targeting. 
 
In this context, the change in the urban poverty deficit can be decomposed into two 
additive elements: (a) the extra monetary cost (with respect to the initial situation) 
required to bring current poor households above the poverty line given the new set of 
                                                 
∗ The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent 
the views of The World Bank or its Executive Directors. For their comments we are grateful to Shanta 
Devarajan, Alan Gelb, Delfin Go, Eduardo Ley, Cristina Savescu, Augusto de la Torre, and Quentin 
Wodon. Rebecca Lessem provided excellent research assistance. Address for correspondence: 
sdessus@worldbank.org, sherrera@worldbank.org and rdehoyos@worldbank.org. prices, and (b) the monetary cost required to pull out of poverty those households falling 
below the poverty threshold due to price increases. Thus, we take into account both the 
change in the depth of poverty, i.e. the increase in the poverty gap given the increase in 
food prices, and the additional number of urban poor.  
 
Our estimates depend on three country-specific parameters for which we have data of 
limited comparability: (i) the change in the domestic relative price of food, which varies 
across countries due to different  global prices pass-through to domestic prices; (ii) the 
share of the total household budget allocated to food consumption by those households 
below the poverty line or sufficiently close to it to be considered vulnerable to price 
changes; and (iii), the elasticity of substitution between food and non food items for poor 
and vulnerable households. Given the uncertainty regarding these three parameters we 
consider a range of plausible values in our computations, based on information for a 
subset of countries. On the other hand, there exists reliable and comparable country-
specific information on urban poverty and income distribution that we use to estimate the 
change in the poverty deficit. The results show a range of estimates of changes in the 
poverty deficit for each country in our sample; these back-of-the-envelope computations 
can be refined with additional country-specific information as it becomes available. 
 
We focus exclusively on urban poverty for various reasons. First, from the 
methodological viewpoint, it is critical to control for the positive income effect that food 
inflation has on the households which derive their income from agriculture-related 
activities. Unlike rural households, urban ones only derive a small --if any-- share of their 
income from agricultural activities. Hence, the assumption that food inflation will only 
affect the price of their consumption basket, leaving their income unchanged, is not 
unrealistic. In contrast, rural households derive a substantial part of their income from 
agricultural activities, and estimation of the net impact of food inflation on rural poverty 
would require detailed and country specific data which we do not have on a large and 
comparable basis.
1 Hence, the focus on the urban poor does not mean that rural poverty is 
not of concern, but rather, it is an unfortunate consequence of the lack of valuable 
information.  
 
Second, from the policy perspective, it is justifiable to distinguish urban from rural areas, 
in particular when it is advised to resort on targeted transfer programs to mitigate poverty 
(World Bank, 2008). Indeed, these programs are, by nature, located in specific places 
(food-for-work programs, schools to send children) or destined to localizable agents. As 
such, it is possible to assess the adequacy of current and envisaged transfers in cities in 
response to the increase in poverty. Third, the inflation information captured by CPIs 
reflects price changes taking place in the cities rather than in rural areas. Finally, focusing 
on urban areas—where a welfare loss will unambiguously occur as a consequence of 
higher food prices—allows us to identify countries at risk of potential social unrest.    
 
                                                 
1 Not only the net buyer/seller position of rural households vis-à-vis each commodity needs to be known 
(such data are not always available in households surveys; and many developing countries simply do not 
have sufficiently recent surveys), but also the cost and factors’ market structures to estimate who would 
benefit the most from food price spikes: farmers, land owners, intermediaries, etc. There are alternative approaches to estimate the impact of the price shock on the poor. 
Compared with recent papers on the same subject (Ivanic and Martin, 2008, Wodon et al. 
2008), the present paper differs on several grounds. First, we use household survey data 
for 73 countries
2 covering 88 percent of the population living in developing countries in 
2005; second, in addition to measuring the impact of food price changes on the headcount 
poverty rate, we differentiate between the cost attributable to the “new poor” versus that 
one of the existing poor before the price increases; and third, our approach focuses only 
on urban households, ignoring income effects for food-producing households. Similarly 
to Ivanic and Martin, 2008 and Wodon et al. 2008, the present study focuses on the short-
term micro-economic impacts, ignoring second-round or multiplier effects which could 
occur in the longer run.
3 
 
Despite the methodological caveats and data limitations, this paper is a useful first step to 
identify countries facing the highest risk level of severe disruption in their fight against 
urban poverty as a result of the food price shock. The note also gauges the order of 
magnitude of a ceiling for the cost of these interventions, understood as aiming to offset 
the impact of food price spikes on urban poverty at US$1 or US$2 a day.
4  
 




Define   as the per capita household income of household “h” and z as the minimum 
income required to purchase a basket of goods that satisfies a required level of 
consumption (the poverty line), most of which of food. If q individuals fall below z, the 
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The increase in food prices will raise the monetary cost of affording the same basket of 
goods. Assuming that incomes remain constant (consistently with our focus on 
consumption effects), the change in the poverty deficit (PD) due to an increase in the 
poverty line can be defined as follows: 
                                                 
2 Since the household survey data for China is not available, the computations for this country relied on the 
PovCal parameterization of the Lorenz curve.   
3 Ivanic and Martin (2008) also  account for changes in unskilled wages rates so as to capture higher factor 
remuneration in agriculture. According to the authors, citing Ravallion (1990), such a wage response could 
take several years. Passa Orio and Wodon (2008) estimate the longer term impact of specific commodity 
price spikes on the price of other commodities through a social accounting matrix multiplier effect 
approach, and suggest that indirect effects are much more pronounced for oil than food. Dessus (2008), 
using a computable general equilibrium model, assesses the impact of imported inflation on domestic prices 
accounting for behavioral effects and substitution effects in the short, medium and long run in Tanzania. 
4 This paper consistently uses poverty lines and GDP expressed in purchasing power parities derived from 
the ICP 1993, as new poverty lines derived from the ICP 2005 have not yet been disclosed.  
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q q q < < < ≤ < + K K 1 1 . The first two elements on the 
right hand side of equation (2) account for the increase in the poverty gap keeping the 
number of poor constant at q, i.e. the old poor; the last element captures the increase in 
poverty deficit explained by an increase in the number of poor from q to 
ι  or the new 
poor. To measure the importance of PD in terms of the total resource of the economy, we 
define the cost of an increase in food prices as the change in the PD divided by the sum 
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1 , quasi equivalent from a macro-economic 
perspective to GDP. 
  
Notice that the change in PD accounted by the old poor is equivalent to the concept of 
compensating variation (CV) introduced by Hicks and developed later by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980): it has been applied in numerous empirical studies including Friedman 
and Levinsohn (2002), Niimi (2005), and Ackah and Appleton (2007). The CV measures 
the change in money income or expenditure,  ) (⋅ c , needed to maintain a constant utility 
level after a change in prices: 
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where  p and u represent the vector of prices in the economy and the utility level, 
respectively. Using a second order Taylor expansion of the expenditure function, 
Friedman and Levinsohn (2002) show that the compensating variation can be 
approximated by the following expression:  
 





where x are the quantities consumed and s is the compensated derivative of demand. The 
second element in the right hand side of expression (4) allows for substitution effects, i.e. 
a change in quantity demanded given a change in relative prices. Equation (4) can be 
reformulated in terms of proportional changes and household budget shares (Friedman 
and Levinsohn, 2002):   
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 where wi is the budget share allocated to good “i”, in our case being food,  ij ε  is the price 
elasticity of good “i” with respect to price change “j”. Therefore, the critical elements to 
estimate the compensating variation for the poor given a change in relative prices are: (a) 
the share of food consumption in total household budget of the poor, (b) the change in 
relative prices, and (c) the elasticity of substitution between food and non-food items for 
households below the poverty line. The CV for the old poor plus the extra cost accounted 
by the new poor will give the change in poverty deficit (PD) brought about by the 
increase in the price of food.  
 
The three parameters required for our computation vary across countries and between 
households within the same country. Calculating the PD for a large number of countries 
implies collecting --and in some cases estimating-- this household-level information, 
which is a gigantic undertaking. In this paper we simplified the task by computing the PD 
for each country under three different scenarios capturing plausible values of the three 
parameters yielding three scenarios: a central one, and a lower and upper bounds 
scenarios, respectively. The values of the parameters are discussed in the next section.    
 
B. Stylized facts and data issues 
 
Figure 1 shows how the food budget shares and the price elasticity of demand change 
with the income level in a sample of about 100 countries.
  5. As income increases, the 
food budget share declines from around 70 percent to 10 percent. The price elasticity of 
food demand is non-linear, decreasing at low income levels, and then increasing, with a 
range from -.4 to -.1. 
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Our estimations consider a range for the food budget shares from 50 percent to 70 
percent, with a mid point of 60 percent. Recall that Figure 1 shows country averages, and 
hence the poor in each country will have food budget shares higher than the national 
                                                 
5 Data source for food budget shares and price elasticities Seale et.al. (2003). average. The food price-elasticity can take extreme values of -.3 or -.1, with a mid value 
of -.2. 
 
The relationship between international and domestic food prices is country-specific. The 
transmission of high world prices to domestic prices depends on the depth of 
international markets for different commodities, countries’ exchange rates variations 
against the US dollar during the period, the degree of openness of the different economies 
and domestic policies in response to the shock. Domestic relative food prices are affected 
by inflation of non-food prices, which also varies by country.  
 
Evidence on price transmission mechanisms is limited to few countries and 
commodities.
6 But incomplete pass-through combined with differentiated price inflation 
across commodities is consistent with the observation of relatively moderate food 
inflation in many developing countries relative to the overall consumer price index. Table 
1 shows the changes in food relative prices in a few countries of different income levels. 
In all cases, food price inflation is significantly lower than international levels. The FAO 
obtains the same result with a different sample of countries over the period 2007-8.
7  
 
Based on this range of observed relative price changes over the period 2005-8, the 
estimations reported in the next section considered three alternative scenarios for food 
relative price changes: 10%, 20% and 30%.   
 










India 16  22  12 
Tanzania 32  39  14 
Colombia 13  22  18 
Nigeria 18 17 -2 
Bolivia 23 38 30 
Bangladesh 17  21  8 
Mexico 9 15 12 
Chile 12  20  16 
Egypt 24  38  28 
Pakistan 33  42  18 
*The non-food price inflation is estimated assuming a weight of 50% for food in the 
overall consumer price index. The change in relative prices is the difference between 
food and non-food inflation. Source: calculations based on data from national statistical 
offices.  
 
                                                 
6 FAO research suggests that the pass-through of the world price of rice in US$ to domestic markets in six 
Asian countries currencies over the period Q4-2003 to Q4-2007 ranged between 6 and 64 percent, or one-
third on average (FAO, 2008). Baffes and Gardner (2003) shows that pass-through effects are weak and 
they vary across countries and commodities. 
7 See FAO (2008). Based on the possible values of the three varying parameters we derived three estimates- 
central, upper and lower bounds- of the increase in the poverty line, or conversely the 
reduction in real income, resulting from higher food prices.
8 Table 2 summarizes results 
of three scenarios. The higher the relative price change, the higher the food share in total 
consumption, and the lower the price elasticity, the higher the decline in real income, in 
our case, 20 percent. 
 
Table 2 Estimates of change in real household income as a result of the change in relative food prices 
 Relative  price 
change (%) 




Change in real 
income (%) 
Upper bound scenario  30  70  0.1  -20 
Central scenario  20  60  0.2  -11 
Lower bound scenario  10  50  0.3  -4 
Notes: The figures in the first three columns capture possible parameter values determining the real income 
effects of price changes among poor and near poor households (i.e households near the poverty line). The 
upper and lower bound estimate can be interpret as the worse and best case scenario, respectively. The 
figures are based on the stylized facts shown in Figure 1 and Table 1.  The change in real income is 
estimated using equation 5. 
 
In turn, for a given change in real households’ income the country-specific information 
on income distribution allows us to estimate the change in the poverty deficit. The 
computations are based on the micro dataset part of the Global Income Distribution 
Dynamics (GIDD) model.
9 The GIDD data includes 73 household surveys for low and 
middle income countries, adding up to 1.2 million households and over 5.1 million 
individuals. This large dataset together with aggregate information for China accounts for 
88 percent of the population of the developing world in 2005. The advantage of having 
such a rich dataset is that we can compute the initial and final PD taking full account of 
household heterogeneity, without relying on simple average characteristics of the poor or 




This section reports our estimates of the impact of food inflation on urban poverty at 
US$1 and US$2 a day. Given the large number of country- and scenario-specific 
estimates, this section shows detailed results for those countries with the higher change in 
the poverty deficit under the central scenario. The results for all countries under each of 




A.  US$1 a day urban poverty 
 
                                                 
8 The use of three different values for the three parameters yields 27 possible combinations. For the sake of 
clarity, we only report here the lower bound, the central, and the upper bound estimates. 
9 For an explanation of the GIDD and an application on the ex-ante changes in global income distribution 
see Bussolo et al. (2007). Table 3 reports urban poverty rates and poverty deficits before the price shock and 
changes in poverty headcount and the poverty deficits after the price shock in the twenty 
most severely affected countries. The increase in urban poverty rate (or headcount, i.e., 
the proportion of the population below the poverty line), averages 4 percentage points, 
and ranges from 1 to 6 percentage points. The cost (estimated as the change in the 
poverty deficit) reaches an average 0.5 percentage points of GDP, ranging from 0.1 to 2.8 
percent. It is noteworthy that over 90 percent of the additional monetary cost stems from 
the loss in real income of those who were already poor before the price shock. 
Conversely, the additional monetary cost accounted for by the increase in the number of 
poor is relatively modest. This is due to the fact that the poverty gap among the new poor 
is much smaller than that of the old poor after the crisis.  
 
Table 3. Urban poverty at US$1 a day: Countries at risk 
  
Initial situation 

















Nigeria 54.6  10.0   6.1  2.8  2.6  0.2 
Nicaragua 36.5  5.1   3.7  1.5  1.4  0.1 
Haiti 43.5  6.4   3.5  1.2  1.2  0.0 
Madagascar 35.8  2.6   4.0  0.8  0.8  0.0 
Uganda 42.0  2.6   5.4  0.8  0.7  0.0 
Cambodia 25.1  1.1   5.8  0.5  0.4  0.1 
Benin 17.1  0.8   5.8  0.4  0.4  0.1 
Tanzania 21.9  0.9   4.2  0.4  0.3  0.1 
Ghana 10.0  0.4   3.1  0.2  0.2  0.0 
El Salvador  9.6  0.6   1.4  0.2  0.2  0.0 
Mauritania 7.0  0.2   1.8  0.2  0.1  0.1 
Côte d'Ivoire  8.6  0.3   2.4  0.2  0.1  0.1 
Bangladesh 8.7  0.2   5.0  0.1  0.1  0.0 
Ethiopia   15.2  0.2   5.4  0.1  0.1  0.0 
India 5.7  0.1   3.3  0.1  0.1  0.0 
Burkina Faso  8.6  0.2   4.3  0.1  0.1  0.0 
Bolivia 4.8  0.2   1.2  0.1  0.1  0.0 
Pakistan 3.0  0.0   3.2  0.1  0.1  0.0 
Mali 3.4  0.1   2.3  0.1  0.1  0.0 
Burundi 12.5  0.2   2.1  0.1  0.1  0.0 
*Notes: (1) Authors’ own calculations using data from the GIDD; (2) the poverty deficit is expressed as a proportion 
of the sum of total household incomes; (3) the estimated cost is defined as the difference between the initial PD and 
the PD after the price shock; (4) households surveys have been standardized to year 2005 using information from 
national accounts; see Annex I for methodological details and Annex II for a complete listing of countries with 
results. 
 
The results show that initial conditions matter tremendously in the determination of 
poverty impact, reflecting different initial urban / rural population distributions, poverty 
levels, gaps and income distributions. Nigeria’s 2005 GDP per capita might for instance exceed that of Ghana, yet the additional cost of alleviating urban poverty induced by food 
price increases is much higher in Nigeria (2.8 percent of GDP) than in Ghana (0.2. 
percent of GDP).  
 
Figure 2 shows how countries facing similar increases in poverty rates might also face 
very different costs (i.e. changes in poverty deficit) implied by the shock. For instance, 
India and Haiti’s urban poverty rates increase by a similar magnitude (3.3 and 3.5 
percentage points respectively) in the central scenario. But the change in poverty deficit 
would exceed 1 percent of GDP in Haiti, while it would be 0.1 percent in India. This is 
explained by the different initial urban poverty rates in these two countries, with that of 
Haiti being significantly higher.  
 
Figure 2. Estimated changes in urban poverty deficits and poverty rates (US$1 a day) 
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*Central, upper and lower scenarios defined in Table 2 
 
These figures vary with the upper and lower bound assumptions of real income changes. 
In Nigeria, for instance, assuming a 20 percent decline in real income induces a change in 
urban poverty deficit in excess of 5 percent of GDP. Yet, only in 5 countries out of 73, 
the upper bound cost estimate (at US$1 a day) exceeds 1 percent of GDP. 
 
In contrast, there are 57 countries (out of 73 included in the sample) for which the 
estimated change in poverty deficit represents less than 0.1 percent of GDP when using 
central estimates, or 49 when using upper bound estimates. Within this 49 countries, the 
average change in urban poverty headcount approaches 1 percent of the urban population, 
which is not negligible. However the cost as a share of GDP is relatively small suggesting 
that most of these countries have the domestic financial capacity to address the problem. 
 
B.  US$2 a day urban poverty 
 
This section uses a different definition of poverty, probably more applicable to an urban 
setting. Table 4 reports the urban poverty rates and poverty deficits before the price 
shock, and the change in poverty headcount and poverty deficit after the price increase in 
the twenty most severely affected countries. In these countries the rise in urban poverty 
rates reaches an average of 5 percentage points, ranging from 3 to 8 percentage points. 
This would correspond to an average change in the poverty deficit (as a share of GDP) of 






Table 4. Urban poverty at US$2 a day: Countries at risk 
  
Initial situation 

















Nigeria 86.0  42.9   2.9  8.4  8.2  0.1 
Nicaragua 66.0  24.4   3.9  5.4  5.2  0.2 
Haiti 61.6  19.7   2.9  3.3  3.3  0.1 
Madagascar 68.2  13.0   5.0  3.0  2.9  0.1 
Uganda 76.3  12.8   3.0  2.8  2.7  0.1 
Benin 56.1  8.3   5.5  2.5  2.4  0.1 
Cambodia 62.5  8.6   4.8  2.3  2.2  0.1 
Tanzania 62.2  7.0   5.1  2.0  1.9  0.1 
Mauritania 39.3  4.3   6.9  1.7  1.5  0.1 
Pakistan 46.7  3.2   8.4  1.5  1.4  0.1 
Ghana 37.7  4.3   5.1  1.4  1.3  0.1 
India 44.2  3.4   6.8  1.4  1.3  0.1 
Bangladesh 47.4  3.5   5.8  1.3  1.2  0.1 
Côte d'Ivoire  35.1  3.4   5.4  1.2  1.1  0.1 
Mali 32.0  2.4   5.7  1.1  1.0  0.1 
Indonesia 25.8  1.8   7.5  1.0  0.9  0.1 
Ethiopia 61.0  2.8   4.9  0.9  0.9  0.0 
El Salvador  25.0  3.2   3.6  0.9  0.8  0.1 
Guinea   26.2  1.8   7.7  0.9  0.8  0.1 
Cameroon 25.5  1.7   5.3  0.7  0.7  0.1 
*Notes: (1) Authors’ own calculations using data from the GIDD; (2) the poverty deficit is expressed as a proportion 
of the sum of total household incomes; (3) the estimated cost is defined as the difference between the initial PD and 
the PD after the price shock; (4) households surveys have been standardize to year 2005 using information from 
national accounts, see Annex I for methodological details and Annex II for a complete list of countries  
 
 
Interestingly, 17 of the 20 most affected countries at US$2 a day are also among those 
most affected at US$1 a day (Table 3). The higher number of poor and near poor at US$2 
a day than at US$1 a day explains the larger costs. In turn, the relationship between the 
change in poverty rates and the change in poverty deficits becomes less pronounced. 
Nigeria and Haiti register similar increases in poverty rates, 3 percentage points, but the 
monetary cost is much higher in Nigeria (8.4 against 3.3 percent of GDP). 
 With this definition of poverty the number of poor increases significantly, as do the cost 
estimates in all countries.
10 There are eight countries in which the cost exceeds 2 percent 
of GDP in the central scenario (Table 4), another eight in which the cost fluctuates 
between 1 and 2 percent, and in the remaining 56 countries the cost is less than 1 percent 
of GDP. As in the previous case, most of the change in the poverty deficit (94 percent on 
average) is accounted for by the “old” poor becoming poorer rather than by the increase 
in the incidence of poverty.  
 
 
Figure 4. Estimated changes in urban poverty deficits and poverty rates (US$2 a day) 
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10 These cost estimates vary with the upper and lower bound assumptions of real income changes (Table 2).  
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This paper estimates the urban poverty impact of recent food price inflation and its 
monetary cost in a sample of countries covering 88 percent of the population in the 
developing world. To achieve this large coverage, we relied on simplifying assumptions 
which, necessarily, entails a trade-off in terms of country-specific accuracy. One of the 
more critical aspects and limitations of this exercise is its exclusive focus on urban 
poverty. At the same time, focusing on urban poverty allows interpreting more safely the 
estimates as a minimum impact on poverty in the absence of readily functioning 
compensating mechanisms between rural and urban areas.  
 
The results are useful for focusing attention on the identified set of countries where the 
urban poverty deficit increases the most and hence are more likely to experience demands 
for redistribution and, perhaps, social unrest. In most countries, the induced monetary 
cost of additional urban poverty is estimated to be small relative to GDP, even if poverty 
rates increase significantly. Nevertheless in some countries the cost is significant. 
Unsurprisingly, the results suggest that countries with high initial poverty rates and 
poverty gaps are particularly vulnerable to food price increases. For the same reasons, 
estimated changes in urban poverty deficits at US2$ a day exceed that estimated at US1$ a day. At US$1 a day, the average change in poverty deficit in the 20 most severely 
affected countries amounts to 0.5 percent against 2.2 percent at US$2 a day. 
 
In all countries included in the study the change in the poverty deficit is mostly induced 
by the negative real income effect of those households who were poor before the price 
shock, while the change in poverty deficit attributable to new households falling in 
poverty is negligible. Thus, in countries already equipped with effective targeting 
mechanisms, such as conditional cash transfers, the strategy that would produce faster 
results at lower costs would be to scale up such programs rather than designing tools to 
identify new poor. The challenge in this case lies in the ability to adjust responses to the 
permanent vs. transitory nature of the shock, yet to a large extent unknown.
11 In other 
countries resources should be devoted to rapidly implement effective targeting 
mechanisms in cities. Workfare programs or direct hand-outs could constitute short-term 
responses to the crisis in this context (World Bank 2008b). 
 
While it is unrealistic to envisage perfect targeting, the rough estimates provided in this 
paper nevertheless provide an order of magnitude of the cost (excluding operational and 
implementation costs) of an efficient transfer program from coverage and targeting 
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 Annex I. Standardizing Household Surveys to 2005 
 
The periodicity at which developing countries undertake nationally representative 
household surveys is very irregular, with some countries having one every 2, 5 or even 10 
years and others not having any at all. This irregularity of survey years results in a very 
low number of countries for which a survey is available for a particular year. To be able 
to work with the income/expenditure distributions of a relatively large sample of 
countries (73) and anchor them to a given year (2005) we had to use some assumptions. 
We collected surveys for years circa (usually before) 2005 and assume that the 
distribution between the survey year and 2005 remained constant; additionally --and 
perhaps more importantly-- we assumed income/expenditures for all households grew at 
a rate equal to the growth in private consumption reported in national accounts (NA). 
Numerous studies discuss the appropriateness of NA information as an indicator of 
changes in household incomes (see the debalte between Bhalla, 2003 and Ravallion, 
2003). Although we acknowledge the limited relationship between consumption from NA 
(basically a residual) and the disposable incomes/expenditures of households, we believe 
that in the absence of household survey information it is better to “gross-up” the survey’s 
income using NA information rather that assuming that zero growth occurred between the 
survey year and 2005. This “grossing-up” process often overestimates actual growth in 
household incomes (Ravallion, 2003). This bias in household incomes (keeping 
distribution constant) will result in an underestimation of the changes in the poverty 
deficit reported in this paper. Finally, we believe that the magnitude of this bias is small 
since the discrepancies between growth in survey mean and private consumption from 
NA will have an effect over a limited number of year, i.e. the difference between survey 
year and 2005 (usually 2 or 3 years).       Annex II. Detailed country results 
 
A1: Urban Poverty at US$1 a Day: Estimated Poverty Headcounts and Deficits 
 

























Albania  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Argentina  3.3  0.1 3.7 0.1 0.1  0.0  4.6  0.2 3.6 0.1 
Armenia  0.0  0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.8  0.0 0.1 0.0 
Azerbaijan  0.2  0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0 0.3 0.0 
Burundi  12.5  0.2 14.6  0.3 0.3  0.0 16.4  0.3 13.4  0.2 
Benin  17.1  0.8 22.9  1.2 1.2  0.1 26.6  1.7 19.4  1.0 
Burkina Faso  8.6  0.2 12.9  0.3 0.3  0.0 15.2  0.4 11.0  0.2 
Bangladesh  8.7  0.2 13.7  0.3 0.3  0.0 17.1  0.5 10.5  0.2 
Bulgaria  0.0  0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Belarus  0.1  0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0 0.1 0.0 
Bolivia  4.8  0.2 6.0 0.3 0.3  0.0  7.2  0.4 5.6 0.3 
Brazil  3.9  0.1 4.5 0.1 0.1  0.0  5.5  0.2 4.0 0.1 
Chile  1.0  0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0  0.0  1.3  0.0 1.1 0.0 
China  0.2  0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0 0.2 0.0 
Cote d'Ivoire  8.6  0.3 11.0  0.5 0.4  0.0 13.4  0.6 9.8 0.4 
Cameroon  3.5  0.1 5.2 0.1 0.1  0.0  6.8  0.2 4.3 0.1 
Colombia  2.8  0.1 3.2 0.1 0.1  0.0  3.7  0.1 2.8 0.1 
Costa Rica  1.3  0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0  0.0  1.7  0.0 1.3 0.0 
Dominican Rep.  0.5  0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0 0.6 0.0 
Ecuador  4.6  0.2 6.0 0.3 0.3  0.0  6.3  0.4 4.7 0.3 
Estonia  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ethiopia  15.2  0.2 20.6  0.3 0.3  0.0 25.5  0.5 17.5  0.3 
Georgia  1.1  0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0  0.0  1.7  0.0 1.1 0.0 
Ghana  10.0  0.4 13.1  0.6 0.5  0.0 15.3  0.8 11.0  0.4 
Guinea  2.9  0.1 4.2 0.1 0.1  0.0  5.5  0.2 3.4 0.1 
Gambia, The  2.2  0.1 3.3 0.2 0.2  0.0  4.1  0.2 2.4 0.1 
Guatemala  4.2  0.1 5.0 0.2 0.2  0.0  5.2  0.2 4.8 0.1 
Guyana  0.2  0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0 0.2 0.0 
Honduras  3.5  0.1 4.1 0.1 0.1  0.0  4.6  0.1 3.7 0.1 
Haiti  43.5  6.4 47.0  7.5 7.5  0.0 48.9  8.6 44.9  6.8 
Hungary  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Indonesia  1.3  0.0 2.4 0.1 0.0  0.0  3.5  0.1 1.7 0.0 
India  5.7  0.1 9.0 0.2 0.2  0.0 12.3  0.3 6.8 0.2 
Jamaica  0.1  0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0 0.1 0.0 
Jordan  0.1  0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0 0.2 0.0 
Kazakhstan  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Kenya  0.7  0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0  0.0  1.5  0.0 0.7 0.0 
Kyrgyz Rep.  0.5  0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0  0.0  1.7  0.0 0.5 0.0 
Cambodia  25.1  1.1 30.9  1.6 1.5  0.1 34.6  2.1 28.0  1.3 
Lao PDR  2.7  0.0 3.7 0.0 0.0  0.0  4.7  0.1 3.1 0.0 
Sri Lanka  0.6  0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0  0.0  2.9  0.0 1.1 0.0 
Lithuania  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Morocco  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Moldova  1.0  0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0  0.0  1.9  0.0 1.2 0.0 
Madagascar  35.8  2.6 39.8  3.4 3.4  0.0 43.2  4.2 37.3  2.9 
Mexico  0.6  0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0  0.0  1.0  0.0 0.6 0.0 Macedonia, FYR  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mali  3.4  0.1 5.7 0.2 0.2  0.0  7.8  0.3 4.6 0.2 
Mauritania  7.0  0.2 8.8 0.4 0.4  0.0 11.6  0.6 7.8 0.3 
Nigeria  54.6  10.0 60.7 12.7 12.6  0.2  64.8  15.3 57.4 11.1 
Nicaragua  36.5  5.1 40.2  6.6 6.5  0.1 43.9  8.0 38.1  5.7 
Nepal  8.9  0.1 14.8  0.1 0.1  0.0 17.1  0.2 11.4  0.1 
Pakistan  3.0  0.0 6.2 0.1 0.1  0.0  9.2  0.2 4.5 0.1 
Panama  1.6  0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0  0.0  2.2  0.0 1.7 0.0 
Philippines  2.2  0.0 3.3 0.1 0.1  0.0  4.5  0.1 2.5 0.1 
Poland  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Paraguay  3.2  0.1 3.8 0.1 0.1  0.0  4.2  0.2 3.3 0.1 
Romania  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Russian Fed.  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Senegal  0.8  0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0  0.0  1.7  0.1 0.9 0.0 
El Salvador  9.6  0.6 11.0  0.8 0.8  0.0 12.3  1.0 10.1  0.7 
Thailand  0.0  0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tajikistan  3.9  0.1 5.9 0.1 0.1  0.0  7.7  0.2 5.1 0.1 
Turkey  0.3  0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0  0.0  1.3  0.0 0.5 0.0 
Tanzania  21.9  0.9 26.1  1.2 1.2  0.0 30.2  1.6 23.6  1.0 
Uganda  42.0  2.6 47.4  3.4 3.4  0.0 52.0  4.2 43.5  2.9 
Ukraine  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Uruguay  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Uzbekistan  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Venezuela, RB  2.6  0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  3.6  0.1 2.8 0.0 
Vietnam  0.0  0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0 0.1 0.0 
Yemen, Rep.  2.8  0.0 4.3 0.1 0.1  0.0  6.0  0.1 3.3 0.0 
South Africa  3.1  0.1 3.9 0.1 0.1  0.0  4.7  0.1 3.4 0.1 
  
A2: Urban Poverty at US$2 a Day: Estimated Poverty Headcounts and Deficits 
 

























Albania  5.7  0.2 8.5 0.3 0.3  0.0 11.2  0.5 7.0 0.2 
Argentina  10.4  0.7 11.3  0.9 0.9  0.0 13.9  1.1 11.0  0.8 
Armenia  8.7  0.4 13.3  0.7 0.7  0.1 16.9  1.1 10.2  0.5 
Azerbaijan  9.0  0.3 13.2  0.5 0.5  0.0 17.0  0.8 10.8  0.4 
Burundi  35.9  1.3 39.4  1.7 1.7  0.0 42.1  2.0 37.5  1.4 
Benin  56.1  8.3 61.6 10.8 10.7  0.1  65.2  13.2 58.6  9.3 
Burkina Faso  37.4  2.2 41.8  2.9 2.8  0.0 46.2  3.5 38.9  2.4 
Bangladesh  47.4  3.5 53.2  4.8 4.7  0.1 57.4  6.0 49.9  4.0 
Bulgaria  3.4  0.1 4.0 0.2 0.2  0.0  4.8  0.3 3.5 0.2 
Belarus  0.2  0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0 0.3 0.0 
Bolivia  17.6  1.7 21.6  2.2 2.2  0.0 24.8  2.8 19.3  1.9 
Brazil  14.2  0.8 16.4  1.1 1.1  0.0 18.1  1.4 15.0  0.9 
Chile  3.0  0.1 3.6 0.2 0.2  0.0  4.0  0.2 3.2 0.1 
China  1.8  0.1 2.7 0.3 0.3  0.0  3.6  0.6 2.1 0.2 
Cote d'Ivoire  35.1  3.4 40.5  4.6 4.5  0.1 45.0  5.7 37.3  3.9 
Cameroon  25.5  1.7 30.8  2.5 2.4  0.1 36.0  3.2 27.7  2.0 
Colombia  7.9  0.4 9.4 0.5 0.5  0.0 10.6  0.7 8.2 0.5 
Costa Rica  4.1  0.1 4.5 0.2 0.2  0.0  5.5  0.2 4.4 0.1 
Dominican Rep.  2.7  0.1 3.1 0.1 0.1  0.0  3.3  0.1 2.9 0.1 
Ecuador  16.7  1.3 18.7  1.7 1.7  0.0 22.4  2.2 17.4  1.5 
Estonia  0.3  0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0  0.0  1.1  0.0 0.3 0.0 
Ethiopia  61.0  2.8 65.9  3.8 3.7  0.0 69.9  4.6 63.1  3.2 
Georgia  6.9  0.3 8.9 0.4 0.4  0.0 10.8  0.6 7.7 0.4 
Ghana  37.7  4.3 42.8  5.6 5.6  0.1 47.5  7.0 39.9  4.8 
Guinea  26.2  1.8 33.9  2.7 2.6  0.1 39.9  3.6 29.1  2.2 
Gambia, The  19.5  1.5 25.1  2.1 2.0  0.1 29.0  2.8 22.0  1.7 
Guatemala  11.6  0.6 14.5  0.8 0.8  0.0 16.7  1.0 12.8  0.7 
Guyana  2.1  0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0  0.0  3.4  0.1 2.1 0.0 
Honduras  12.7  0.7 15.2  0.9 0.9  0.0 17.7  1.1 13.4  0.7 
Haiti  61.6  19.7 64.5 23.0 23.0  0.1  66.0  26.0 63.1 21.0 
Hungary  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Indonesia  25.8  1.8 33.3  2.9 2.8  0.1 39.5  4.0 29.0  2.2 
India  44.2  3.4 51.0  4.7 4.6  0.1 56.5  6.1 47.1  3.9 
Jamaica  3.3  0.1 4.3 0.2 0.1  0.0  6.4  0.2 3.9 0.1 
Jordan  3.8  0.1 5.6 0.3 0.2  0.0  7.3  0.4 4.5 0.2 
Kazakhstan  3.0  0.1 4.8 0.2 0.2  0.0  6.6  0.3 3.6 0.1 
Kenya  8.6  0.2 11.5  0.3 0.3  0.0 15.6  0.4 9.3 0.2 
Kyrgyz Rep.  13.8  0.6 17.7  0.9 0.9  0.1 22.1  1.3 16.0  0.7 
Cambodia  62.5  8.6 67.3 10.8 10.8  0.1  71.0  12.9 64.6  9.5 
Lao PDR  23.2  0.7 30.0  1.1 1.1  0.0 35.6  1.5 26.0  0.9 
Sri Lanka  20.1  0.4 26.8  0.7 0.7  0.0 32.1  1.0 22.7  0.5 
Lithuania  0.9  0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0  0.0  2.4  0.1 1.2 0.0 
Morocco  1.4  0.0 2.5 0.1 0.1  0.0  4.0  0.1 1.8 0.0 
Moldova  10.5  0.5 14.2  0.7 0.7  0.0 17.9  1.0 11.9  0.6 
Madagascar  68.2  13.0 73.2 16.0 15.9  0.1  75.7  18.6 70.2 14.2 
Mexico  8.8  0.5 11.5  0.8 0.8  0.0 14.0  1.0 9.9 0.6 
Macedonia, FYR  1.3  0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0  0.0  3.1  0.1 1.7 0.0 Mali  32.0  2.4 37.7  3.5 3.4  0.1 42.8  4.5 35.0  2.8 
Mauritania  39.3  4.3 46.2  5.9 5.8  0.1 51.6  7.5 41.9  4.9 
Nigeria  86.0  42.9 88.9 51.2 51.1  0.1  90.9  58.6 87.2 46.2 
Nicaragua  66.0  24.4 69.9 29.8 29.7  0.2  73.6  34.7 68.0 26.6 
Nepal  32.7  0.8 37.5  1.0 1.0  0.0 40.0  1.3 35.4  0.9 
Pakistan  46.7  3.2 55.1  4.7 4.6  0.1 62.2  6.2 50.2  3.8 
Panama  4.8  0.2 5.4 0.2 0.2  0.0  6.0  0.3 5.1 0.2 
Philippines  18.1  1.2 22.0  1.7 1.6  0.0 25.5  2.2 19.6  1.4 
Poland  0.0  0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0 0.1 0.0 
Paraguay  10.6  0.6 12.6  0.8 0.8  0.0 13.9  1.1 11.3  0.7 
Romania  2.9  0.1 4.3 0.2 0.2  0.0  5.7  0.3 3.5 0.1 
Russian Fed.  0.5  0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0  0.0  1.7  0.1 0.8 0.0 
Senegal  19.8  1.1 26.3  1.9 1.8  0.1 31.1  2.6 22.4  1.4 
El Salvador  25.0  3.2 28.6  4.1 4.1  0.1 31.6  5.0 26.5  3.6 
Thailand  3.1  0.1 4.7 0.1 0.1  0.0  6.0  0.2 3.7 0.1 
Tajikistan  26.4  1.3 32.3  1.9 1.8  0.0 38.9  2.5 28.3  1.5 
Turkey  7.0  0.3 9.4 0.5 0.4  0.0 11.3  0.6 7.9 0.4 
Tanzania  62.2  7.0 67.3  9.0 8.9  0.1 71.8 10.8 64.7  7.8 
Uganda  76.3  12.8 79.3 15.6 15.5  0.1  81.8  18.0 77.9 13.9 
Ukraine  2.1  0.1 3.6 0.1 0.1  0.0  5.0  0.2 2.7 0.1 
Uruguay  1.9  0.0 2.7 0.1 0.1  0.0  3.3  0.1 2.0 0.1 
Uzbekistan  0.2  0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0 0.2 0.0 
Venezuela, RB  12.1  0.2 14.4  0.3 0.3  0.0 17.0  0.4 12.4  0.3 
Vietnam  3.4  0.1 5.0 0.1 0.1  0.0  6.8  0.2 3.8 0.1 
Yemen, Rep.  27.4  1.2 34.3  1.7 1.6  0.1 39.6  2.3 30.3  1.4 
South Africa  14.6  0.7 17.8  1.0 0.9  0.0 20.3  1.2 15.9  0.8 
 